KAPA pattern drama
The issue
Back on October 1st, the FAA blindsided the Denver flying community by immediately banning pattern work at Centennial Airport (KAPA). Pattern work, meaning flying laps in roughly a rectangle near the airport with usually a touch-and-go landing on each lap, is critically important to flight training, as one of the hardest parts of learning to fly is learning to land well, and the best way to learn to land is to practice it a lot. KAPA is a busy airport for several reasons, but a major one is that a lot of flight training is done there. Now that’s been thrown into disarray.

Airplanes at Centennial Airport (KAPA)
The memo from the FAA, provided by Centennial Airport, describes the FAA’s reasoning, though not the lack of notice, nor of any investigation of alternative solutions. In short, the FAA claims there were a handful of instances, roughly 60 times between May 1, 2025 and May 1, 2026, where aircraft departing from the parallel runways at KAPA drifted within 600 ft laterally and 200 ft vertically of each other. They further classified two of these as “near-mid air collisions” (NMACs), which means within 500 ft laterally and 100 ft vertically. As a result of these “loss of separation”/”unmitigated convergence” incidents, the FAA banned simultaneous parallel departures at KAPA, which is a de facto ban on pattern work.
All of this is near and dear to me because I learned to fly at KAPA and still do the vast majority of my flying there. I have many friends who are flight instructors at KAPA, impacted for the reasons outlined above, and even non-flight-instructor pilots (like myself) still need to do a few laps in the pattern on occasion for various reasons.
The causes
The problem is thus: aircraft are getting close to each other during departures, potentially close enough to collide. The FAA specifically identifies drift due to wind, incorrect pilot turns, and delayed recognition of impending issues by ATC as causal factors.
With the parallel runway centerlines at KAPA being only 700 ft apart, it doesn’t take much directional deviation for two aircraft taking off simultaneously to get within 600 ft of each other, meeting the FAA’s threshold for a loss of separation.
I’ll add a few more potential causes to the mix:
- Confusion about the meaning of the “fly straight out” versus “fly runway heading” instructions from Tower during takeoff clearance. The former means to follow the extended centerline of the runway, i.e., to compensate for wind. The latter means to fly the heading of the runway, but don’t compensate for the wind. If one was meant but the other was done, well, that’s an obvious potential source of problems. (A corollary problem is that it can be difficult to fly perfectly on the extended centerline without a moving map, even when using visual landmarks.)
- Handoffs into the pattern being a little clunky sometimes. At KAPA, pattern work is usually done on the shorter parallel runway (17R/35L), but almost all initial takeoffs are done from the longer parallel runway (17L/35R). Moreover, the two runways often have different tower controllers. The transition from the upwind off the long parallel into closed traffic on the short parallel has on occasion seemed less coordinated than one would hope, presumably because of the added challenge of sequencing in new traffic or reduced situational awareness for each controller about the runway not under their control.
- The timing of touch-and-goes being difficult to consistently predict. Depending on where a plane touches down, how long it takes the pilot to clean up the aircraft configuration to take off again, and how quickly they get the throttle in, there can be considerable variation in the delay between being on final approach and being on climb-out again. Go-arounds add even more uncertainty. This of course makes takeoff clearances on the other runway more difficult to time correctly.
Independent research
I decided to pull the data and do my own analysis. While somewhat more coarse than the FAA’s radar-based data, it’s easy these days to pull ADS-B-sourced timestamped geolocation data from public archives. I used data from adsb.lol as aggregated by adsb.exposed in a ClickHouse database, which let me use SQL to narrowly select for close encounters in the sky. Specifically, I searched for all instances in the FAA’s aforementioned study window where two aircraft were within 600 ft laterally and 200 ft vertically, less than 7000 ft in altitude (specifically pressure altitude, because of ADS-B), greater than 50 kt ground speed (so as to remove false-positives with aircraft on the ground), and within 5 miles of KAPA. I then manually filtered out obvious formation flights of aircraft (e.g., when two aircraft intentionally take off in a close formation from the same runway). I found that the ADS-R data, which is (effectively) ADS-B retransmitted by the FAA, was less noisy than the directly received ADS-B data, so I further selected for that. What was left was 29 episodes.
While 29 is less than 60, I have no reason to think this isn’t a representative sample. The discrepancy in count can be explained by the FAA also including TCAS alerts (as those aren’t necessarily going to show up in ADS-B data), timestamp coarseness (the data had roughly 10-second intervals), aircraft without ADS-B reporting (notably, at least around KAPA, most military aircraft and most law enforcement aircraft), or other items that could have been on radar tapes but not ADS-B data. Also, the accuracy of altitude and position data itself is subject to tolerances.
(Disclosure: about half of the episodes involved aircraft associated with at least one of the two flying clubs I’m a member of at KAPA. I have personally flown several of the listed planes, though not during the listed episodes. Also, I personally know at least some of the pilots who were at the controls in some of the episodes.)
Several of the 29 episodes were spot-checked against graphical flight path plots on adsbexchange.com; all spot-checked flights did appear to involve aircraft losing separation due to drift or similar during departure. None of the spot-checked flights involved a loss of separation on approach.

List of 29 occasions of a loss of separation between two aircraft during departure from KAPA between May 1, 2025 and May 1, 2026 (Click to enlarge)
Of the 29 episodes I identified, 3 fit the NMAC (near-miss) criteria (500/200 ft), with the closest being one with 437 ft of lateral separation and zero vertical separation. This is slightly different than the FAA’s findings, which indicated 2 NMACs; the caveats mentioned earlier about data apply equally here.
Unfortunately, the ATC audio from 2025 and early 2026 is no longer available from free public sources, so I can’t determine whether or not a tower controller advised any of the involved aircraft about their situations nor what, if any, specific instructions were given.
So what does a loss of separation look like in terms of flight paths? Here’s an example of the September 3, 2025 incident involving N739LV and N1330N:

Loss of separation between N739LV and N1330N on September 3, 2025. Closest separation was about 565 ft laterally and 50 ft vertically. (Click to enlarge)
In this case, N739LV drifted a touch to the west. Winds on the ground reported five minutes earlier were from 110 degrees at 4 kt, i.e., light winds from the east.
So was this specific situation dangerous? Well, maybe or maybe not. N1330N was already in the pattern in left traffic on 35L, and N739LV was turning to join the pattern on the same runway. If N739LV had turned about 10 seconds earlier, the situation could have potentially been not great. On the other hand, we don’t have the tower audio, so it’s probable that Tower was keeping an eye on both of them and kept N739LV flying straight(-ish) out until they were well clear of any conflict for the turn. Instructions along those lines, where planes are told to fly straight out and must not turn until specifically cleared to do so by tower, are common.
The FAA made an unfair comparison
The FAA listed the airports they looked at: Centennial (KAPA), Charlotte (KCLT), Dallas-Fort Worth (KDFW), Fort Worth (KFTW), George Bush-Houston (KIAH), Chicago O’Hare (KORD), DeKalb-Peachtree (KPDK), Seattle-Tacoma (KSEA), and San Francisco (KSFO). All of those except for KPDK and KAPA are busy class B airports, which effectively means that the vast majority of operations are part 121 commercial jets, not exactly a fair comparison to the part 91 general aviation operations that dominate at KAPA. Even KPDK isn’t really a peer: it has fewer than half the number of annual operations compared to KAPA (169,000 vs 305,000 in 2025).
Comparing GA-heavy KAPA with a bunch of large commercial airports borders on ridiculous.
Suspicion around the campfire is that the FAA bowed to pressure from the numerous anti-airport people in the vicinity of KAPA to cut down traffic by eliminating pattern work. I have no evidence that’s the case; I’m just sharing the rumor.
A better comparison
A far more fair comparison would have been Deer Valley (KDVT) north of Phoenix. Not only does KDVT have about 60% more traffic than KAPA (490,000 operations vs 305,000 in 2025), it also has parallel runways that are spaced exactly as far as at KAPA, 700 ft. (Note that some sources incorrectly list KAPA as having 600 ft separation, but this is easily refuted by measuring with a GIS tool like Google Earth.) Importantly, KDVT is heavily used for flight training, like KAPA, and, also like KAPA, doesn’t have any scheduled passenger jet traffic.
I pulled the data for near-misses in the vicinity of KDVT just as I had for KAPA, in the same time period, and wouldn’t you know it: there were FAR FAR more issues at KDVT, on average one every couple of days. I counted 154 such events, including 24 meeting the NMAC criteria.
One particularly spicy encounter on April 13, 2026 saw N6296W and N714SC come within 279 ft of each other, 217 ft laterally and 175 ft vertically. Or, since that technically doesn’t count as an NMAC, consider the May 18, 2025 close encounter between N169AG and N222TD with 360 ft of lateral and 25 ft of vertical separation. Both of those were considerably closer than anything that happened at KAPA during that time period.
Here’s the filtered dataset for KDVT for you to draw your own conclusions. (If you find any issues, such as formation flights that I missed, please let me know!)
My point is that it’s very odd that the FAA is coming down hard on KAPA when the problem is considerably worse elsewhere.
Solutions
So, even though I think KAPA is being picked on unfairly, I will readily admit that it would be far better to have fewer or no losses of separation between departing aircraft at KAPA. Here are some suggestions from my perspective as a pilot; I’m not an air traffic controller, so take all of these with a grain of salt.
- Instruct all touch-and-go traffic to fly their upwind (takeoff) leg angled out about 15 degrees relative to the other runway. This should provide additional lateral separation to compensate for potential drift, regardless of whether the touch-and-go or the non-local departing traffic was actually at fault. It also would provide margin for things like unexpected go-arounds on the parallel runway, where timing-based approaches would be less effective.
- Instruct all non-local departing traffic to fly their upwind angled out about 15 degrees the other way. This could be done with or without the previous suggestion.
- Add more buffer time between touch-and-go traffic and non-local traffic.
- Be more willing to call go-arounds for touch-and-go traffic on short final if it looks like the timing will be tight.
- Better coordination between tower controllers when different people are controlling each of the two parallel runways.
Just some ideas. All I hope is for pattern work to resume soon!









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